Brain Fertilizer

I think it is worth it to stop by the old Lunaville.org site every once in a while. Please note: it has a new URL.

March was a bad month for the United States. However, it is interesting that even with the recent upsurge in violence, US fatalities and woundings are dropping off, and will probably be at the 2nd lowest level since last September, with only February being lower.

Missed opportunities. What was going on in February that allowed the violence to be so low? What caused it to rise up again? Was there anything we could have done to prevent the surge in violence?

We captured Saddam in December. I was predicting that with his capture, we'd have things calmed down by February or March at the earliest, but certainly things we would have withdrawn the bulk of our troops from Iraq by the Transfer of Authority on 30 June.

Looking back, it appears that two significant trends developed between December and March, along with one major failure.

Trend #1: Until the capture of Saddam al-Hussein, the insurgency was largely driven by former Ba'athists, loyal to Saddam. They were incorporating foreign fighters into their ranks, but targeting, planning, and execution were under the control of people who wanted to re-establish Saddam. They wanted us out, and as quickly as possible.

But then we caught Saddam. Operations that were already planned were exectued. We started to roll up their organization, and some people who felt their time was limited attempted to make some "last gasp" attacks, including trying to attack currency exchange convoys to get more funding. The insurgency was running on inertia. Eventually that motive force ran out.

But while we were trying to capture the last of the Former Regime Elite/Loyalists, the foreign fighters were re-organizing and making plans. This is when Zarqawi grew in power and influence. He spent the end of January and early February planning to instigate a civil war between Sunni and Shia sects, and much of the violence in late February and early March was, in fact, suicide bombings by Sunnis against Shias. Only intervention from the Grand Ayatollah Sistani kept the Shias in check. But Zarqawi and his foreign fighters/al Qaeda were up and running. They've shifted focus to the forces of stability among the Iraqis (security chiefs, police, politicians, educators), but they are still active. They collected in Fallujah, and it was the Marines attempt to clear them out that led to the bulk of US deaths in April and early May. We pulled back when it became clear that fighting was turning more people against us than we were eliminating.

Trend #2: It was in December and early January that the Interim Governing Council began asserting its power, particularly the Grand Ayatollah Sistani. In the Arab world, "Everyone Loves a Winner" is a basic truth, and so the more power Sistani demonstrated, the more power people gave him. Everyone was trying to hitch their wagon to his rising star (if I may mingle and mangle my metaphors). Muqtada al-Sadr wanted power among the Shias, and had hired many young, under-educated, unemployed men to be his followers and muscle. He attracted many of the disaffected. At some point, he felt he could gain more power by fighting the US and criticizing Sistani, and began causing troubles. It is entirely possible that he was encouraged to cause trouble by Zarqawi or his associates, as it would play into their hands.

In general, it became clear by late April that the evolved insurgency no longer wanted the United States out of Iraq, at least, not any time soon. The worst possible result for al Qaeda and the Islamic terrorist movement worldwide would be to allow the United States to leave on its own terms. Rather, they wanted more conflict, to draw us in closer, escalate the fighting, and demoralize the public at home. They want us out, yes, but only after 2-3 years that would help provide propaganda for recruiting and fundraising, and then let us leave only on their terms, defeated and demoralized.

We didn't play along. In fact, we have recently taken more of a low profile, leaving the Iraqis themselves as the main targets for the insurgency. Which is only right and proper, as the country does belong to the Iraqis, and they must learn to stand up and defend it.

Which brings us to the failure:
Until June, we utterly failed in developing a professional security force that was willing to endure hardship and risk for the safety, security, and betterment of the nation. We recognized that failure in the insurgency of late April/early May, and have changed direction and rectified that error. Part of the rectification is to take a lower profile so that the Iraqis must do more to defend themselves. In places like An Najaf, it was at the request of the Iraqis. There are dozens of smaller towns were it has been very successful. When is the last time you've heard about difficulties in Tikrit? Some of the recent attacks were in Baqubah, which we only handed over to the Iraqis just four days ago. Unfortunate timing...except that the police didn't cut and run, didn't walk off the job yet. Maybe they will. But each day they stand firm is a victory for Iraq.

Allawi is calling for elections as early as November. If it can be done, I think that would be a good thing. Much of the possibility for success lies in the ability of the Iraqis to successfully end the insurgency. It must come from within their own communities.